

The Germans drove north toward the east-west road connecting the towns of Karteschewka and Prokhorokva.Īfter fighting through several Soviet defensive positions and advancing nearly five miles, the panzer group reached the road around midnight. (Nov.At daybreak on Monday, July 12, 1943, SS Sturmbannführer Christian Bachmann, the panzer group commander of the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division, ordered his unit to cross the Psel River and attack. With this account, Clark (Operation Epsom) confirms his reputation as one of Britain’s outstanding scholars of operational military history.

The losses of men and armor sustained there rendered it impossible to do more than check locally the measured sequence of attacks that earned the Red Army a decisive strategic triumph on the Eastern Front in less than two years. The Wehrmacht failed to break through the sophisticated Russian defense system and failed to wear down the Red Army’s offensive power.

But from its inception Operation Citadel was a tactical victory for the U.S.S.R. The matrix of German defeat was “Hitler’s “confused strategic thinking,” which from the beginning set the Wehrmacht too many conflicting missions. Particularly effective is his integration of foxhole and tank-crew perspectives with broader discussion of the course of a head-down slugging match that decisively tipped the Eastern Front’s balance in favor of a resurgent Red Army. He blends archival research, participant interviews, and professional insight in presenting the genesis, conduct, and consequences of the Battle of Kursk (German code name Operation Citadel). Royal Military Academy historian Clark offers a comprehensive analysis of WWII’s greatest land battle and one of history’s greatest armor engagements.
